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Busting the "Fuzzbuster": Rethinking
Bans on Radar Detectors
I.

Introduction

Radar detectors are radio receivers, tuned to the frequency of
police speed-measuring radar, which alert their users that their vehicles are about to pass through a field of electronic surveillance.' This
warning enables drivers to check their speed to determine whether it
is within the legal limit. At present, three jurisdictions prohibit the
use of radar detectors-Virginia, Connecticut, and the District of
Columbia.2 Although critics argue that radar detector bans run
counter to sound policy and raise legitimate constitutional questions,
courts reviewing these legislative bans have tersely dismissed these
questions of law and policy, upholding the bans in each case.$
This Comment analyzes the policy questions and legal issues
raised by a legislative ban on radar detectors and argues that neither
state legislatures nor Congress should prohibit the use of radar detectors. Part II briefly discusses the reasons that cause motorists to
purchase such devices as well as the reasons that motivate
lawmakers to prohibit them. Part III surveys the law in its present
state and introduces examples of legislation that have been proposed
in Pennsylvania and the United States House of Representatives.
Part IV addresses the constitutional issues raised by legislative bans
and the judicial treatment of these issues. Part V discusses policy
obstacles to the devices' prohibition and suggests that these policy
obstacles, together with constitutional implications, should persuade
legislatures that radar detector bans are not desirable.
II.

Background

In 1974, Congress responded to a perceived national energy crisis by enacting the national fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit as an
emergency fuel savings measure.' Since its inception millions of motorists have chosen to ignore the limit; 5 yet, until recently, the unI. People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 206, 324 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1982).
2. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 25-57 and accompanying text.
4. See Impact and Implementation of the 55-Mile-Per-Hour Speed Limit: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1987) (statement of Gov. Bangerter (R.-Utah)).
5. See id.
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popular law remained in effect for purported safety reasons.' Congress' decision to allow states to raise the speed limit to sixty-five
miles per hour on rural interstates 7 attests to the depth of the law's
unpopularity.
The most widespread means of enforcing the speed laws is radar,' which enables police to monitor the speed of vehicles outside

visible range.9 Police radar is less expensive and less sophisticated
than its military counterpart; 10 more importantly, police radar is

often inaccurate. 1 Motorists, faced with what they perhaps consid-

ered inappropriate speed limits, sought to protect themselves from
police radar's widespread use and frequent inaccuracy, as well as
from the consequences of speeding violations." One means of protection was the radar detector, and motorists have purchased over six
million of these devices.' 3 Dale Smith, the inventor of the original

radar detector, the "fuzzbuster,"' 4 was an electrical engineer in the
police radar industry, and created the device after receiving a radarbased speeding citation that he believed was issued in error. 15

Opponents of the devices, particularly insurance companies,
have maintained that the devices are the equivalent of "burglar's
tools" or "drug paraphernalia,"' 6 and have demanded radar detector
bans. Notwithstanding the absence of empirical data supporting the
6. See id.
7. 23 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1988).
8. For example, from January 1, 1979 until August 11, 1979, there were 133,015 speeding arrests in Virginia; of these arrests, 115,195 resulted from the use of police radar. Bryant
Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325, 1329 n.4 (W.D. Va. 1981).
9. Police radar uses the physical concept of the "Doppler Shift," transmitting microwaves that bounce off the most attractive target within range and return to a receiver in the
radar unit. The time differential between transmission and receipt is then used to calculate a
vehicle's speed. See Patterson & Trichter, Police Radar 1980: Has the Black Box Lost its
Magic, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 829, 834 (1980).
10. Id. at 856. Radar's use by the military is an invaluable asset to national defense and
undergoes constant development and improvement at great cost. Police radar units, on the
other hand, are often rudimentary devices selected through a lowest-bidder procurement procedure. Id.
11. See id. (extensive review of police radar's shortcomings). For a summary of radar's
inaccuracy and its policy ramifications, see infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text.
12. Consequences include the immediate cost of fines, the expenditures of time, raised
insurance rates or denial of coverage, and suspension of one's driving privileges. See infra
notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
13. See Smith, The Finest Open-Mindedness Money Can Buy, CAR & DRIVER, Apr.
1988, at 92.
14. Manufactured by Electrolert, Inc., 475 Park Avenue South, New York, New York
10016.
15. Telephone interview with Janice Lee, President, Radio Association Defending
Airwave Rights, Inc. (Oct. 27, 1988) (the organization is a political organization that supports
and lobbies for radar detector manufacturers).
16. See Smith, supra note 13, at 92 (quoting Brian O'Neill, President, Insurance Institute of Highway Safety).
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proposition that radar detectors decrease highway safety, 17 numerous
proposals to ban the devices have been introduced by state legislators. 18 Although these efforts "have not been fruitful in the past 10
years,"' 9 Virginia, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia have
succeeded in prohibiting these devices.
Both sides of the issue have staunch supporters, but each is
guilty of occasional illogic."0 Antidetector arguments are often predicated on safety, even when the available data is unsupportive and
contradictory.2 ' Detector supporters maintain that the devices are
sold to enable buyers to "check their speed." 2 If verifying speed is
truly the desired result, manufacturers could achieve equal success
by marketing speedometer-activated speed alarms rather than radar
detectors.
Despite this occasional illogic, legitimate issues remain unresolved. Judicial decisions often avoid questioning the need for a
ban, preferring to defer questions of policy to the legislature. 8 The
issue whether to prohibit radar detectors has not seen the last of
controversy, as new legislation is constantly being introduced. 2 Legislators should look behind the current state of the law and question
the assumptions upon which antidetector legislation is based.
III. The Current Status of the Law
A.

JurisdictionsProhibitingRadar Detectors

Statutory bans on radar detectors are in effect in Connecticut, 5
Virginia, 6 and the District of Columbia. 7 This section analyzes various judicial responses to challenges to the constitutional validity of
these statutes. 8 Courts in all three jurisdictions have consistently upSee Smith, supra note 13, at 92.
See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
Smith, supra note 13, at 92 (quoting 1986 Maryland State Police Report).
See id. at 95.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
Smith, supra note 13, at 95 (quoting Director of Market Planning for Radio Shack,
of radar detectors).
See infra notes 25-57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 60, 67-70.
25. CONN. AGENCIEs REGS. § 14-137-1 (authorized by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14137(a) (West 1987)).

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
a retailer
23.
24.
26.

VA. CODE ANN.

§§

46.1-198.1 (1986).

27. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 736 (1981).
28. Connecticut, Virginia, and the District of Columbia are not the only states possessing case law concerning radar detectors.
A driver arrested for using a radar detector in violation of a Michigan law prohibiting the
equipping of a vehicle with a "radio receiving set" capable of receiving police transmissions
had his conviction overturned when the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that a radar de-
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held the constitutional validity of the statutory bans. 29 The courts'

treatments differ, however, regarding particular provisions within
each statute.
1. Connecticut.-Connecticut's regulation prohibiting radar

detectors, s0 promulgated under a grant of statutory authority to the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to "limit the use of-any device or
accessory which appears to him to be required for safety . .,"31 was
first challenged in State v. Anonymous (1979-3).32 The court in

Anonymous (1979-3) held that mere possession of a radar detector
did not come within the regulation's effect; thus, in the absence of
proof that the defendant installed or operated the device, the court
held that the defendant was not guilty of violating the law. 3
The regulation was challenged on substantive constitutional

grounds a year later in State v. Anonymous (1980-8)."' The court
held that the law was not federally preempted, 35 not unduly burden37
some on interstate commerce, 6 and not unconstitutionally vague.

The court premised its decision on the grant of authority to the Motor Vehicle Commissioner to prescribe any action bearing a reasonable relationship to public safety 8 and, thus, summarily dismissed
tector was not such a receiver. People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 324 N.W.2d 834 (1982). The
Gilbert court deferred to the legislature the decision of whether to prohibit radar detectors. Id.
For the policy arguments involved in the case, see infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
An Indiana case, Wallman v. State, 419 N.E.2d 1346 (Ind. App. 1982), interpreted a
similar statute prohibiting police radio reception as not extending to radar detectors. See also
People v. Moore, 92 Misc. 2d 807, 401 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1978) (statute prohibiting portable
police radios challenged and upheld as evincing no legislative desire to ban radar detectors);
People v. Faude, 88 Misc. 2d 434, 388 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1976) (statute prohibiting portable
police radios did not apply to radar detectors, which were deemed incapable of transmitting or
receiving voice messages); Annotation, Possession or Operation of Device for Detecting or
Avoiding Traffic Radar as Criminal Offense, 17 A.L.R.4TH 1334, 1338-40 (1982).
29. See Fields & Hricko, ProhibitingRadar Detectors: Legal Issues, 37 FED'N INS. &
CORP. COUNS. Q. 317, 319 (1987); Annotation, supra note 28, at 1335.
30. The regulation states: "No device designed to give advance information to a motorist
of the use of radar speed-indicating instrument in the area of the highway which such motorist
is approaching may be installed or used in any motor vehicle operating on the highways of
Connecticut." CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 14-131-1. See also State v. Anonymous (1979-3), 35
Conn. Supp. 659, 660, 406 A.2d 6, 7 (1979) (quoting Connecticut regulation).
31. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-137(a) (West 1987).
32. State v. Anonymous (1979-3), 35 Conn. Supp. 659, 406 A.2d 6 (1979).
33. Id. at 663, 406 A.2d at 9.
34. 36 Conn. Supp. 551, 421 A.2d 867 (1980).
35. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. However, the court granted the defendant a new trial on procedural grounds: State v. Anonymous (1980-8), 36 Conn. Supp. 551,
421 A.2d 867 (1980).
38. Id. at 558, 421 A.2d at 871.
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each constitutional issue.39
2. Virginia.-In Crenshaw v. Commonwealth,0 the Virginia
Supreme Court addressed the issue of a statutory presumption per-

mitting conviction of a motorist for the "mere presence of a radar
detector

. . .

despite credible evidence that the device was inaccessi-

ble or unavailable for use."'4 1 Because the law permitted the application of the presumption as a purely arbitrary mandate, the court
found the law violative of due process."2
. Virginia's General Assembly amended the law to require that a

power source for the device exist and that the device be readily accessible for use at the time of citation before presence alone could
constitute primafacie evidence of a statutory violation."' Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane" upheld the law as it exists today 45 against
the same constitutional objections raised in the Connecticut case,
Anonymous (1980-8) . The court in Bryant rejected the notion of a
congressional intent to preempt state regulation of this type of radio
reception, rejected the notion that the law unduly burdened inter-

state commerce, and rejected as "all but frivolous" a charge of unconstitutional vagueness. 47
3. District of Columbia.-Smith v. District of Columbia" addressed a consolidated appeal from convictions resulting from enforcement of the District of Columbia's ban on radar detectors.4 9
39. The court found "no conflict" with federal policy, in this case the Federal Communications Act, "no infringement upon the national interest in maintaining a free flow of interstate traffic sufficient to warrant invalidation of this regulation," and treated the issue of unconstitutional vagueness as speculative and inapplicable because it was immaterial to the
specific conduct of the defendant. Id. at 558-59, 421 A.2d at 870-71.
40. 219 Va. 38, 245 S.E.2d 243 (1978).
41. Id. at 43, 245 S.E.2d at 247. The statute provided that "[tihe presence of [a radar
detector] shall constitute prima facie evidence of the violation of this section." Id. at 40, 245
S.E.2d at 246.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1 (1986).
43. The amended law was validated in Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 288
S.E.2d 475 (1982), in which a motorist who tried to disconnect and hide his radar detector was
nonetheless found guilty when the court concluded that circumstantial evidence, e.g., braking
sharply in the presence of police radar, relieved the prosecution of the need to prove that the
device was actually in operation.
44. 507 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Va. 1981), affd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1982).
45. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-198.1 (1986).
46. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
47. Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325, 1328-29 (W.D. Va. 1981),
affd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1982).
48. 436 A.2d 53 (D.C. 1981).
49. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 736 (1981) provides:
No person shall, in the District of Columbia, sell or offer for sale, or use or
have in his possession in a motor vehicle, any device designed to detect or
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The appellants' constitutional arguments, identical to those addressed by the Virginia and Connecticut courts, were rejected." The
court in Smith, however, was uniquely strident in its judicial condemnation of radar detectors, stating that "radar detectors have no
utility other than aiding an illicit effort to drive in an irresponsible
manner, evading society's punishment for such conduct." ' 51 Further,
the court suggested that "the nexus between the prohibition of radar
detectors and highway safety is obvious" 52 and equated the devices
5
with burglars' tools. 3
Perhaps the most cogent judicial decision supporting a ban is
Electrolert Corp. v. Barry.5 4 The court in Electrolert tersely dismissed the federal preemption issue raised on appeal, noting its accord with the existing case law, 55 and instead, pursued the commerce
clause issue, concluding, as had the courts in Connecticut and Virginia, that the statute was not unduly burdensome." The court's
analysis was flawed, however, because it failed to conclusively address the District of Columbia's failure to amend its laws forbidding
the mere presence of radar detectors within the city limits. 7
4. The Common Thread.-The case law of Connecticut, Virginia, and the District of Columbia reflects an unquestioned judicial
deference to state legislatures. In upholding the detector bans, these
courts did not require a legislative finding that banning detectors
would promote safety; rather, the courts accepted the existence of
such a causal relationship. Additionally, the cases failed to address
the shortcomings of police radar. 58 Nevertheless, this favorable treatcounteract police radar. This section shall not apply to any vehicle or equipment
used by the Armed Forces of the United States.
50. Smith, 436 A.2d at 53.
51. Id. at 59.
52. Id. Such a conclusion, however, does not comport with the findings of respected
surveys and ignores the absence of a correlation between speed per se and safety. See infra
notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
53. Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53, 59 (D.C. 1981). Even conceding, for
the sole purpose of addressing this particular issue, that the only purpose of radar detectors is
to facilitate violation of speeding laws, to equate such a minor statutory violation with the
serious and criminal violations of carrying "machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, blackjacks, and
switchblades," id., is to transcend common sense. See RADIO ASS'N DEFENDING AIRWAVE
RIGHTS, INC., ARE RADAR DETECTORS BURGLAR'S ToOs? (copy on file at Dickinson Law
Review office). See also infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
54. 737 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 111 n.2.
56. Id. at 113-14.
57. The court noted that "the District of Columbia has never threatened to enforce the
statute against [innocent possessors] if they engaged in such conduct." Id. at 113. See infra
notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
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ment of detector bans continues to incite new legislative attempts to

prohibit radar detectors in other jurisdictions.
B. Recent Legislative Developments
This section examines two recent bills proposing bans on radar
detectors. One proposed a ban at the federal level; the other pro-

posed a state ban. Both bills were predicated on the idea that radar
detectors are nefarious devices, their only function being to permit a

person to break the law.59
1. The Anti-Scofflaw Act of 1987.-Introduced in the first
session of the 100th Congress, the Anti-Scofflaw Act of 1987,0 by
its very title, announced an intention to severely penalize detector

users. The bill provided for penalties and fines exceeding those provided by comparable state legislation" and extended the scope of the
law's reach to manufacturers. 62 The bill was referred to the House
Committee on Criminal Justice on May 6, 1987, and remained there
until the end of the legislative term. Representative Jacobs reintroduced the bill in 1989,63 but the bill was referred to the House Judi-

ciary Committee.
Unquestionably, Congress has the power to enact such legislation; 64 however, the nationwide criminalization of a segment of the
electronics industry and its consumers is arguably unjustifiable and
implicates questions of federalism. 5 Proponents of federalism allege
that the issue is best left to state legislatures. 66 An example of the
59. See Fields & Hricko, supra note 29, at 33-34.
60. H.R. 2102, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) proposed to amend Chapter 2 of title 18,
United States Code, by adding the following:
§ 36. Radar Detectors
(a)(I) Whoever manufactures or sells a radar detector in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
(2) Whoever possesses in a motor vehicle in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce a radar detector shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than six months, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "radar detector" means any device or
mechanism to detect the emission of microwaves employed by police to measure
the speed of motor vehicles on highways for law enforcement purposes.
61. Id. The typical state statute provides for fines commensurate with the crime. E.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198.1(a)(2) (1986) ("upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of
not less than $25 nor more than $100.").
62. H.R. 2102, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
63. H.R. 224, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
64. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Impact and Implementation of the 55 Mile-Per-Hour Speed Limit: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works
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state approach is an antidetector bill introduced by the Pennsylvania
General Assembly.
2.

The Proposal of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.-A

67
bill introduced in 1988 by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania
incorporated the experience of Virginia's legislature in its draftsmanship. Specifically, the bill included a "lack of power" subsection that

modified the presumption that possession of a radar detector shall
constitute prima facie evidence that the person violated the statute

prohibiting use of the device.68 Such careful tailoring stands in contrast to the "broad-brush" approach of the recent federal legislation,

which essentially prohibited possession of the devices.

9

In addition,

the proposed Pennsylvania statute provided for a reasonable fine of
$100 upon conviction.7 0 Like the federal Anti-Scofflaw Act of 1987,
the Pennsylvania bill died in committee when the legislative term

expired. The failure of both measures reinforces the low priority of
detector bans, and questions whether state legislatures need act on
the issue at all.
and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987).
67. H.R. 2156, Printer's No. 2812, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (Pa. 1988) proposed to add the
following section to title 75 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes:
§ 6116. Prohibition on use of radar detection devices.
(a) General Rule.-It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor
vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth and use any device or mechanism to detect the emission of radio microwaves in the electromagnetic spectrum, which microwaves are employed by police officers to measure the speed of
motor vehicles upon the highways of this Commonwealth for law enforcement
purposes. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any receiver of
radio waves utilized for lawful purposes to receive any signal from a frequency
lawfully licensed by any State or Federal agency.
(b) Presumption.-Except as provided under subsection (c), the presence of
any such prohibited device or mechanism in or upon a motor vehicle upon the
highways of this Commonwealth shall constitute prima facie evidence of the violation of this section. The Commonwealth need not prove that the device in question was in operative condition or being operated.
(c) Lack of Power.-No person shall be guilty of a violation of this section
when the device or mechanism in question, at the time of the alleged offense,
had no power source and was not readily accessible for use by the driver or any
passenger in the vehicle.
(d) Exclusions.-This section shall not apply to motor vehicles owned by
the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof and which are used by
the police of any such government nor to law enforcement officers in their official
duties.
(e) Penalty.-A person who violates this section commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and have the
radar detection device confiscated.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
70. H.R. 2156, Printer's No. 2812, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (Pa. 1988). Cf. People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 209, 324 N.W.2d 834, 843 (1982) (punishment for a civil infraction
should be proportionate to the gravity of the offense).
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3. The Legislative Role.-Despite judicial decisions concluding that the purposes supporting detector bans are obvious, 7 1 legislatures across the country have rejected over one hundred proposals to
ban radar detectors. 72 Elected representatives have not taken this
stance out of ignorancea73 and are not motivated by a desire to boost
their home economies. 74 By contrast, perhaps legislators have consistently refused to enact bans because legitimate constitutional arguments and sound policy reasons exist that outweigh the minimum

putative benefits of prohibiting radar detectors. However, legitimate
constitutional questions have yet to be conclusively addressed.
IV.

Constitutional Obstacles to Radar Detector Bans

A. The Supremacy Clause
When Congress has intentionally prohibited state regulation of
a particular field or when state regulation is in irreconcilable conflict
with the federal regulatory system, a state law may not stand.7 5 At
the heart of the federal preemption argument for radar detectors is
the contention that the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 76
which grants the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority over both the transmission and receipt of radio signals, 7

should extend to radar detector reception of FCC-authorized police
radar transmissions.7 8 The argument continues that it is every citizen's right to receive radio transmission unfettered by regulation,7 9
71. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
72. Since 1962, legislators in 33 states have rejected more than 110 proposals to ban
radar detectors. Telephone interview with Janice Lee, President, Radio Association Defending
Airwave Rights, Inc. (Oct. 27, 1988).
73. Proponents of radar detector bans, especially the insurance industry, are vocal, wellorganized, and well-funded. Particularly vocal is the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS), a well-known insurance trade association. See, e.g., Fields & Hricko, supra note 29
(article authored by two IIHS attorneys encouraging states to prohibit radar detectors).
74. A radar detector manufacturer's products are not the result of a large scale, labor
intensive manufacturing process that one usually associates with political "pork-barrel" or protectionist legislation.
75. Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53, 55-56 (D.C. 1981) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978)). But cf.Smith v. District of Columbia, 436
A.2d 53, 55 n.3 (D.C. 1981) (acknowledging competing definition of preemption; specifically,
that Congress preempts state regulation by implication when the pervasiveness of the federal
scheme or character of the regulated field suggests a congressional intent to occupy the whole
field; and noting that this approach is disfavored by recent Supreme Court cases).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 35 (1962).
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1962) (definition of "radio communications" under the Act
encompasses the transmission of radio waves and all things incidental to such transmission,
including its reception).
78. See 47 C.F.R. § 90.101 (1987) (regulations governing the license and regulation of
police radar transmission frequencies).
79. See 67 CONG. REC. 12335 (1926) (remarks of Sen. Dill supporting an intention to
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and the FCC's lack of radar detector regulations implies a federal
preemption.8" Further, the FCC has explicitly stated that its regulations do not address the subject of radar detectors. 81
Courts have consistently rejected the preemption argument, noting that even an expansive reading of the FCC's regulatory purpose
does not reach the use of radar detectors.82 To characterize radar

detectors' narrow function, that of detecting the presence of a radio
frequency devoid of voice or other data, as "communication" is possible only under a "strained construction" of the FCC regulations.8 "

Various radio receivers in widespread use can tune into police
radar frequencies, such as police band "scanner" devices.8 4 Under a
similar construction of the federal preemption issue, a state legisla-

ture could, by extension, prohibit such devices merely because they
can function as receivers of police radar. In addition to enforcement
problems, given the wide range of appearances these devices may

take, such a prohibition would directly interfere with exclusive federal jurisdiction over radio transmission in its accepted definition,
that of conveying voice or data. Although one court called such hy-

potheticals "second-guessing, '85 such conjecture points to the
problems inherent in allowing each state to regulate receivers according to what its own courts interpret as "proper" radio
transmission.
B. The Due Process Clause
In addition to arguing that state legislation banning radar detectors is preempted, ban opponents contend that prohibiting radar

detectors violates the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.
Traditionally, courts have addressed due process arguments in two
"keep radio reception free from government restraint in the United States").
80. Title Ill of the Federal Communications Act provides for "the control of the United
States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmissions.
...
47 U.S.C. §
301 (1962). "Since a radio transmission is meaningless in the absence of a receiver, it logically
follows that the federal government would have exclusive jurisdiction over radio receivers as
well." RADIO ASS'N DEFENDING AIRWAVE RIGHTS, INC., FCC REGULATION OF RECEIVERS
(hereinafter FCC REGULATION OF RECEIVERS] (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
81. FCC Public Notice No. 6138 (Aug. 1, 1985) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review
office). The FCC Public Notice added, however, that "from a policy standpoint the FCC favors authorizing the use of radio, including radars, to promote safety on the public highways or
elsewhere").
82. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous (1980-8), 36 Conn. Supp. 551, 558, 421 A.2d 867,
870 (1980).
83. Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (W.D. Va. 1981),
aff'd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1982).
84. FCC REGULATION OF RECEIVERS, supra note 80. "Scanners" monitor police and fire
emergency frequencies, and are in widespread use by private citizens.
85. Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53, 56 n.3 (D.C. 1981).
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respects: vagueness and arbitrary enforcement. Both arguments
center around the interpretation of statutory language. Courts have
yet to address the threat of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of bans.
Various statutes have survived attacks based on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness.86 A given statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it "fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out 'explicit standards' for those who must apply
it." 87 The typical radar detector ban prohibits "any device designed
to detect

. . .

police radar." 88 Devices manufactured and sold as ra-

dar detectors are not the only electronic devices on the market that
can receive transmissions on the frequencies assigned to police radar.8" As such, any legislation banning radar detection devices would
necessarily reach other, "legitimate," radio receivers such as transistor radios or police-band "scanners.''90

A law that conceivably allows the prohibition of a wide range of
devices clearly unintentionally included would suggest that it is
vague.91 One of ordinary intelligence who purchases a transistor radio ignorant of its police radar receiving capability would have no
reasonable opportunity to learn that the device was prohibited. 9 Police officers might make haphazard assessments of whether a particular radio receiver falls within the proscribed category. Although admittedly obviously marked and prominently displayed commercial
radar detectors overcome this obstacle, devices hidden by the owner
93
or manufacturer are far more difficult to detect.
The proliferation of stuffed "Garfield" animals attached to car
windows94 highlights an inventive concealment approach utilized by
radar detector operators that further complicates enforcement of a
86. See supra notes 37-39, 44-47 and accompanying text.
87. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973).
88. E.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 736 (1981).
89. One police radar manufacturer, Kustom Signals, Inc., issued a sales memorandum
listing the various users of the same frequency. These included such disparate devices as telephone relay equipment and electronic oyster-shucking devices. Telephone interview with Janice
Lee, President, Radio Association Defending Airwave Rights, Inc. (Oct. 27, 1988).
90. See FCC REGULATION OF RECEIVERS, supra note 80.
91. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (decision upholding
antipicketing ordinance against void-for-vagueness and overbreadth challenges).
92. See id.
93. Remote devices, designed to be concealed under the hood of a car, with the only
indication of their presence being a small blinking light on the dashboard, are readily available
in the marketplace. See CAR & DRIVER, Apr. 1988, at 105, col. 1 (advertisement offering for
sale a remote version of a popular radar detector).
94. See There Shouldn't Be a Big Problem as Long as They Leave the Dice, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 18, 1988, at 17, col. I (eastern ed.) (article attesting to the doll's status as "the ... car
window ornament of choice").
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ban and contributes to its arbitrary enforcement. Police arrested a
driver in Ontario, Canada, who had hidden his radar detector inside
such a stuffed cat, after a thorough search of his vehicle uncovered
wires emerging from the back end of the animal.9 5 Police aware of
such shenanigans could presumably stop and search any car sporting
a "Garfield" in its window. Surely innocent purchasers of the stuffed
animals never realized they were providing the pretext to an intru-

sive and inconvenient police search.
' is belied by easy-toThat such a claim is "all but frivolous" 96
imagine cases of arbitrary enforcement. Overworked police would
stop only those motorists with highly visible units while those with
hidden units would presumably continue to violate the law. This is a
problem facing any legislative attempt to prohibit the reception of
97
radio transmission.

C.

The Commerce Clause

1. State Bans and the Dormant Commerce Clause.-Any
state statute seeking to prohibit radar detectors affects interstate
commerce. 98 Whether a particular statute places an unconstitutional
burden on commerce is determined by a balancing test that weighs

"legitimate local interest" and the degree of burden.99 Courts assign
certain priorities to states' interests; highway safety is accorded high
priority. Thus, this interest receives great deference in a commerce
clause analysis.1"' Accorded such deference, all a state must do is
95. Smith, The Finest Open-Mindedness Money Can Buy, CAR & DRIVER, Apr. 1988,
at 95.
96. See Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325, 1329 (W.D. Va. 1981)
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973)), afftd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.
1982).
97. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
98. Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (W.D. Va. 1981),
affd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1982).
On the other hand, Congress unquestionably has the power to ban radar detectors on a
national scale under its implied powers. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). A nationwide ban, however, would create troublesome issues of federalism. See infra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text.
99. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976). State laws
are most apt to run afoul of the dormant commerce clause when they are based on protectionist rationales. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Banning radar
detectors is not an attempt at economic protectionism, but an effort to improve highway safety,
according to its proponents. Therefore, according to the hierarchy of interests protected, it is
undeserving of close inquiry; instead, the legislature promulgating such a law is accorded great
deference by courts. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S.
177 (1938) (highway safety regulations that burden or impede commerce can nonetheless be
considered constitutionally valid); Raymond Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443
(1978) ("In no field has ... deference to state regulation been greater than that of highway
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show that its law is rationally related to a safety end to support such
legislation.
Arguably, prohibition of the use of radar detectors is rationally
related to a state's interest in furthering highway safety.10 1 Forbidding possession,102 however, serves no safety rationale other than to
facilitate enforcement of the law. 103 When faced with an "innocent
possessor" hypothetical, such as the shipment of unopened boxes
containing radar detectors through a jurisdiction banning their possession, courts have either sidestepped the issue10 4 or stricken such a
provision from its laws.105
Pennsylvania's proposed statute avoided this hurdle entirely by
requiring the existence of an available power source for the device
and by requiring its availability for use."0 6 Such a narrowly tailored
proposal would presumably survive commerce clause scrutiny. 0 7
2. Federal Anti-Detector Legislation and Federalism.-The
Constitution expressly places only a few limits on the power of Congress in the interest of state sovereignty.'0 8 One such limit is the
power of Congress to regulate safety on a state's highways: "[Ijt has
long been accepted as a general proposition that a state may regulate
the use of its . . . highways in the interest of public safety."1 1 9 A
federal ban on the use of radar detectors, as proposed by the Antisafety regulation.").
101. See supra note 100. Such a "rational basis" test is easily satisfied under the very
deferential criterion: A court need only satisfy itself that the "local government's safety rationale is not 'illusory' or 'nonexistent.'" Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d I10, 113 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
102. E.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 736 (1981) ("nor have in his possession, in a motor
vehicle, any device designed to detect or counteract police radar").
103. Such a narrow end might run afoul of due process provisions against an "arbitrary
mandate" of enforcement. See Crenshaw v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 38, 43, 245 S.E.2d 243,
247 (1978) (struck down earlier Virginia radar detector ban as creating an "arbitrary
mandate").
104. "We need not decide whether, if the Order indeed extended [to cover such a hypothetical] , .. , it would violate the strictures of the Commerce Clause, for [the jurisdiction
banning such possession, in this case, the District of Columbia] has never threatened to enforce the statute against them if they engaged in such conduct." Electrolert Corp. v. Barry,
737 F.2d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
105. State v. Anonymous (1979-3), 35 Conn. Supp. 659, 406 A.2d 6 (1979) (construed
Connecticut statute prohibiting radar detectors as not forbidding mere possession of the
devices).
106. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
107. It remains, however, for legislators to challenge the underlying premise of highway
safety when determining whether the law is a good law rather than merely a constitutionally
permissible exercise of state police power. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
108. See L.H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 378 (2d ed. 1988).
109. Id. § 6-7, at 417.
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Scofflaw Act of 1987,110 would directly impinge upon this doctrine,
and could create problems paralleling those that recently befell the
national 55 mile-per-hour speed limit."' Specifically, "it is offensive
to have the federal government dictate what has traditionally been,
and should continue to be, within the purview of the individual
states."'1 2
V.

Policy Obstacles to Radar Detector Bans

Even though courts construing antidetector statutes have consistently ruled in favor of their constitutionality, legislators should
not draw from this determination a conclusion that radar detector
bans are in the public interest. Courts avoid factfinding when a
state's regulation of highway safety is at stake,1 3 for, upon the invocation of that interest, a court must only decide whether the legislative means are rationally related to the highway safety end." 4
This Comment does not suggest that those legislatures that have
enacted bans or those legislators actively proposing them do not consider a safety interest when promoting their laws or proposals.
Rather, it suggests that laws and proposals should be firmly
grounded in findings of fact and weighed against competing constitutional and policy interests before being enacted. Even though over
one hundred legislative proposals have been defeated," 5 antiradar
detector legislation maintains its allure, as evidenced by the recent
proposals before the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the United
States Congress. It is an allure, however, based on questionable policy considerations. The Maryland Insurance Commission recently
conducted such a factual determination, and its conclusions tend to
support the need for legislative forbearance.
A.

Safety and the Maryland Insurance Commissioner's Decision

In response to a complaint that insurance companies discriminated against radar detector owners, the Insurance Division of the
Maryland Department of Licensing and Regulation recently instituted a hearing before the Maryland Insurance Commissioner." 6
110. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
111.See Impact and Implementation of the 55 Mile-Per-Hour Speed Limit: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) (statement of Gov. Bangerter (R.-Utah)).
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
116. In the Matter of the Show Cause Hearing on the Use of Radar Detectors, Md.
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Maryland's Insurance Commissioner concluded that an underwriting
guideline refusing liability coverage based solely on the use or ownership of a radar detector contravened state public policy and was
unsupported by factual evidence. 117 Although this decision lacks the
authority of a definitive proclamation by a state or federal court, it
exemplifies the treatment of factual issues in the absence of judicial
deference to a state's police power."1 '
Any legislature contemplating a ban should take the Commissioner's findings of fact into careful consideration. The Commissioner noted that "[w]hile speed per se is identified as the primary
cause of fatal accidents, it is speed which is inappropriate for road
conditions, and not speed in excess of the posted speed limit, that
contributes to the accident."11 9 The Commissioner further noted the
existence of a national study comparing the accident rates of radar
detector users and nonusers, which concluded that the former drove
at least as safely as the nonusers, as measured by the miles driven
per accident experienced.1 2 ° In summary, the Insurance Commissioner's order found that "[s]tudies and testimony establish that the
use of radar detectors alone has little or no effect on speed control or
highway safety." '
In determining that a visible patrol car is the most
effective
method for deterring antisocial, aggressive, or hostile driving behavDept. of Licensing and Reg., Ins. Div., Memorandum and Order No. 814-11/87 (Mar. 17,
1988) [hereinafter Show Cause Hearing] (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
This order was appealed by the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) and on
remand, Assistant Deputy Commissioner Thomas Raimondi declared that the order of March
17, 1988 "shall remain in full force and effect." In the Matter of the Show Cause Hearing on
the Use of Radar Detectors, Md. Dept. of Licensing and Reg., Ins. Div., Memorandum and
Order on Remand No. 815-11/87, Circuit Court Case No. 88078071/CL79023 (July 27,
1989). Again GEICO appealed, this time to the First Circuit Court of Baltimore, which upheld the order as a legitimate exercise of the Commissioner's power. GEICO v. Insurance
Commissioner of the State of Maryland, No. 89235062 (January 16, 1990).
117. Show Cause Hearing, supra note 116, at 15-16.
118. The Commissioner was addressing a question of private insurance law, a factor that
was significant to the case's disposition. The insurance companies had to show more than an
unsupported "rational basis" for their underwriting guidelines, and failed to do so. This demonstrates that the "highway safety" rationale claimed by proponents of a detector ban is unable to stand unsupported by deference to the legislature.
119. Show Cause Hearing, supra note 116, at 7.
120. Id. at 8. The study noted that radar detection device users drive an average of
233,933 miles between auto accidents, as compared with 177,554 among nonusers. The survey
also compared seatbelt use between detector users and nonusers, finding that the former were
12% more likely to use seat belts for both short (under 10 miles) and long distances. The
survey has a statistical margin of error of 5 %. Yankelovich Skelly & White/Clancy Shulman,
Inc., A Comparison of the Automobile Accident Rates of Radar Detection Device Users and
Non-Users (May 27, 1987) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
121. Show Cause Hearing, supra note 116, at 14.
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ior,
the Commissioner's decision supports the contention that radar detectors might even promote safety by extending a patrol car's
effective range. Police patrolling the nation's highways are interested
in safety, not in issuing citations, and any act that has a safety-promoting effect should be encouraged. Arguably, a reckless motorist,
alerted by his detector to police radar speed enforcement, would slow
down sooner than he would have in the absence of such a warning.
The motorist would admittedly avoid a citation; however, his safety,
as well as that of other motorists, would improve. This is not an
illusionary benefit since radar can be detected up to a mile and a
half away from its source. 2 This effect would achieve the same result as visible patrol cars lining both sides of a roadway for a mile
and a half, thereby increasing police efficiency and highway safety.
Furthermore, at the hearing before the Maryland Insurance
Commissioner, "[n]o direct statistical evidence" was produced to
support the insurance companies' suppositions that motorists who
own radar detectors are careless drivers, have more accidents than
the average motorist, and utilize these devices solely to avoid speeding citations. 2 4 Indeed, the only direct evidence offered tended to
show that radar detector owners were actually safer drivers than
nonusers. 2 5 Legislatures contemplating a ban for safety reasons
would do well to take note of the Insurance Commissioner's conclusions. Furthermore, courts examining antidetector legislation in a
commerce clause analysis should take these findings into consideration before concluding that a state's safety interest under its police
power is "obvious.' 2 The Maryland Insurance Commissioner addressed radar detector possession and highway safety concerns only
in the context of insurance underwriting guidelines. Equally important policy issues remain, centering around the prohibition of any
radio reception.
122. Id. See also 2 R.Q.

BRACKETT &

M.L. EDWARD,A COMPARATIVE

EVALUATION OF

(1977) (Texas Transportation Institute); D. CLEVELAND, SPEED
SPEED CONTROL (1970) (Highway Safety Research Institute, University of Michigan);

SPEED CONTROL STRATEGIES

AND
W. JOHNSON, D. LEVINE & D. REINFURT, RADAR AS A SPEED DETERRENT: AN EVALUATION

(1973) (Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina).
123. Police radar's maximum effective range is approximately 7500 feet, with a beam
width of 2580 feet. Patterson & Trichter, supra note 9, at 855.
124. Show Cause Hearing, supra note 116, at 14.
125. id.
126. See Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53, 59 (D.C. 1981). As mentioned in
supra notes 99-101, it is probably beyond the bounds of a court's power of inquiry to question
state policy when a highway safety motive is invoked. Nonetheless, any statistical findings that
directly contradict a state's stated goals might allow a court leeway to more carefully scrutinize the competing interests involved.
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B.

The Pitfalls of Prohibiting Radio Reception

In People v. Gilbert,127 the Supreme Court of Michigan drew a
distinction between the values at stake when the monitoring of electronic surveillance is involved and those at stake regarding the enforcement of traffic laws.12 In deciding that a Michigan statute
prohibiting the reception of confidential police communications did
not extend to prohibit radar detectors, the court noted that "[t]he
policy considerations that support the proscription of vehicular monitoring of confidential police communications do not necessarily extend to the monitoring of police electronic surveillance.""' The court
contrasted the former, which seeks to prevent armed criminals from
escaping police custody, and the latter, which seeks only to discourage, in the case of radar detectors, the commission of a civil
3

wrong.1

1

The distinction is important and speaks directly to those associating radar detectors with burglars' tools or drug paraphernalia. 3 '
Sawed-off shotguns and drug syringes foster and encourage socially
unacceptable criminal behavior; by contrast, radar detectors offer a
means of protection against enforcement of unpopular traffic laws,
which many deem within the bounds of civil disobedience. Banning
criminal radio reception has a clear-cut and possibly lifesaving rationale; banning radar detectors has a questionable, and possibly illusory, safety-enhancing effect." 2 Before a decision to prohibit radio
reception is enacted, legislators should balance the benefits and the
ramifications of prohibiting such reception.
The Michigan court contemplated advances in electronic surveillance and questioned placing its judicial imprimatur on a law
regulating the monitoring of such surveillance. Specifically, the court
recognized that "[p]ersons who wish, by installing electronic detection devices, to protect themselves against such intrusion and surveillance may not be violating any law but merely fearful that their activities, political and not criminal, have come to the attention of the
authorities.' 3 Radar detectors are obviously not designed to protect
unpopular political activities unless, perhaps, motorists are willfully
speeding to protest a law they consider inappropriate. Such an idea
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

414 Mich. 191, 324 N.W.2d 834 (1982).
Id. at 206, 324 N.W.2d at 841.
id.
Id. at 209, 324 N.W.2d at 840.
See supra notes 16, 53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 207, 324 N.W.2d 834, 842 (1982).
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is far-fetched, but illustrates that a legislature empowered to prohibit radio reception in one instance might seek to broaden its scope
to include other forms of surveillance monitoring that it deems unacceptable. Next, a legislature might consider that although the scientific principle upon which radar is based is unassailable, the transition from principle to implementation is not always free from error.
C. Radar's Inaccuracy and Judicial Notice
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges and
jurors may properly take and act upon without proof, because they
already accept them as true."s Jurisdictions that have questioned
the judicial notice of radar evidence have developed the general rule
that, in the apparent absence of a relevant statute, judicial notice
might be taken of the general reliability of police radar to measure
the speed of motor vehicles.13 5 Courts have carefully drawn the distinction, however, between taking judicial notice of the principle of
radar as an electronic device that scientifically and accurately measures the speed of moving objects and taking judicial notice of the
accuracy and operating efficiency of the particular radar device used
136
to measure the speed of a defendant's vehicle in a particular case.
The latter distinction is important; radar's inherent weaknesses
stem not from the scientific means employed, but from the operator's
interpretation of the device's results.13 7 The microwaves radiating
from a traffic radar unit have a wide range, and "lock-on" to objects
that are often far out of visual range.138 Policemen operating traffic
radar must often guess which target is the violator, because, as the
Texas Department of Public Safety noted, "[r]adar cannot identify
the speeding vehicle; the officer must do that."'3 9 As early as 1980,
commentators urged that legislatures with a view toward promulgating stricter, or at a minimum, uniform standards should seriously
consider flaws in radar design and operator training before radar is
134.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 761 (5th ed. 1979).
135. See Annotation, Proof, By Radar or Other Mechanical or Electronic Devices, Of
Violation of Speed Regulations, 47 A.L.R.3D 822, 832 (Supp. 1989). The 18 jurisdictions
according judicial notice to police radar evidence are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Patterson & Trichter, supra note 9, at 855.
138. See id.
139. CINCINNATI MICROWAVE, INC., CINCINNATI MICROWAVE ENGINEERING REPORT:
TRAFFIC RADAR 4 [hereinafter TRAFFIC RADAR] (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office). Accord THE TRAFFIC INSTITUTE, TECHNIQUES FOR RADAR SPEED DETECTION, Pub. No.
401 (Northwestern University Press 2d ed.).
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accorded judicial notice.140 To date, however, the only standards governing radar accuracy are those adopted by manufacturers. Thus, no
governmental standards exist.1 '
In Miami Radar Trial of 1979,142 the defendants, cited for radar-based speeding violations, spent over $40,000 amassing more
than 2,000 pages of testimony and 33 exhibits in a trial based on the
inaccuracy and unreliability of radar. 14 3 After examining the evidence submitted by the defendants, the Florida trial judge excluded
the radar evidence from trial." Unfortunately, however, the case
has had "negligible impact, if any, on other jurisdictions throughout
the nation."" 5 Few motorists victimized by radar's inaccuracy would
choose to mount such an expensive defense; for the average motorist,
the only practical course available is to pay the fine and suffer the
16
consequential increase in insurance rates.
A professional truck driver, faced with a possible loss of livelihood from erroneous radar-based traffic tickets, has only one means
of protection against traffic radar-his radar detector. Prohibiting
these devices would leave such a driver virtually unprotected, his
only other remedy being a prohibitively expensive courtroom defense.
Finally, state legislators contemplating a detector ban may also consider the political effect of such a decision-the effect upon the constituent motorists.
D.

The Negative Effect on Motorists

How a proposed law will affect its constituents should concern
every legislator, with fairness to the public of paramount concern.
Actual traffic speeds are determined almost exclusively by consensus,
rather than by posted speed limits."47 All but the most exceptional
enforcement efforts to reduce traffic speeds are unsuccessful." 48 Issuing more speeding citations will not force motorists to travel at the
posted speed-there is no correlation between the number of citations issued and the average speed of traffic. 149 Furthermore, there is
140. See Patterson & Trichter, supra note 9, at 858.
141. TRAFFIC RADAR, supra note 139, at 3.
142. State v. Aquilera, No. 711-1015 (Fla. Dade County Ct. May 7, 1979). See Grube,
Radar Speed Measurement: The Controversy Continues, 54 FLA. B.J. 461 (1980).
143. Patterson & Trichter, supra note 9, at 854 n.169.
144. Id. at 854.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, 55: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE, SPECIAL
REPORT 204, at 147 (1984).
148. See id.
149. See id.
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no correlation between the number of citations issued and accidents
caused by speeding. 150 Thus, banning radar detectors and increasing
the issuance of speeding tickets would yield few constructive results.
The typical speed on rural highways is in excess of the speed
limit.' Efforts to increase speeding arrests, including banning detectors, may be unpopular to a large part of any legislature's constituency-motorists-who believe that they are driving safely even
though they are exceeding speed limits. High mileage drivers in particular, such as travelling salesmen or professional truck drivers, face
a dilemma: either drive more slowly than the surrounding traffic to
minimize high exposure to police radar surveillance or risk the accumulation of expensive and possibly livelihood-threatening speeding
citations. A motorist arrested for speeding must often pay a substantial fine. 52 In addition, accumulation of several speeding tickets
might, under a "point" system, result in suspension of the motorist's
license.'5 " Such an accumulation would cause increased insurance
premiums or might result in a denial of coverage altogether.'
When radar's inaccuracy is added to such consequences, motorists would likely agree with the opinion of Chief Judge Nesbitt in
State v. Aquilera.155 In deciding to exclude radar evidence from the
trial in Aquilera, Chief Judge Nesbitt stated:
I recognize that many millions of dollars in revenue are involved in "speeding" fines but let it be understood once and for
all, the function of the traffic court is to convict the guilty, acquit the innocent, and improve traffic safety . . . not to be
merely an arm of any revenue collection office. At the same time
if the errors alleged by opponents of radar do exist, then one
must wonder - what percentage of these millions of dollars has
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Show Cause Hearing, supra note 116, at 8 (citing Department of Transportation statistics for 1986 showing a typical consensus speed of 66 miles per hour on U.S.
rural interstates).
152. For instance, in Pennsylvania, a motorist cited for driving 66 miles per hour in a 55
mile-per-hour zone is fined $74.50. Interview with Sgt. Kiser, Carlisle, Pa. Borough Police
(Nov. 15, 1988). See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3362(c) (Purdon 1977) (statutory authorization for the fine schedule).
153. Under Pennsylvania's "points" statute, 3 points are assigned for exceeding the
speed limit by II - 15 miles per hour and 4 points for 16-25 miles per hour over the posted
limit. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1535 (Purdon 1977). An accumulation of II points results in
license suspension pursuant to 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1539 (Purdon 1977). For a look at
the particularly harsh consequences of continuing to drive with a suspended license in Pennsylvania, see Comment, Hit and Run: The Paralyzing Effect of Pennsylvania's Habitual Offender Statute, 93 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1988).
154. See, e.g., Show Cause hearing, supra note 116, at 10 (noting the effects of insurance companies' reaction to accumulated traffic offenses).
155. No. 711-1015 (Fla. Dade County Ct. May 7, 1979).
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been collected from erroneously convicted defendants? - How
many of these defendants have suffered the additional penalties
of extremely higher insurance rates, and the unnecessary compiling of points with the consequent loss of driver's licenses and
perhaps jobs?' 56
Motorists would justifiably resent a paternalistic law prohibiting radar detectors, since these devices provide them with a meaningful
and minimally intrusive defense against the expansive consequences
of speeding citations and inaccurate radar.
VI.

Conclusion

Radar detectors have been the subject of largely uninformed debate, with voices on both sides of the prohibition issue resting their
arguments on first impressions and gut-level distinctions. Legislatures contemplating proposed bans should consider the arguments
proposed by both sides and weigh the empirical data before hastily
enacting laws. The nation's courts are ill-equipped to spend the large
amount of time necessary to complete an exhaustive study of the
relative data and merits of the issue; therefore, leaving final resolution of the issue to the courts does the average citizen a disservice
and may result in the perpetuation of bad law.
The constitutional and policy implications of a ban on radar detectors, coupled with a lack of supportive empirical data, suggest legislative forbearance on this issue. Should legislators decide to pursue
efforts to prohibit the devices, however, proposals should become law
only after a comprehensive finding that radar detectors negatively
affect the safety of motorists and an informed conclusion that this
negative impact outweighs the reasons millions of citizens purchase
radar detectors.
Nikolaus F. Schandlbauer

156.

Id., quoted in Patterson & Trichter, supra note 9, at 854.

